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reassessments was authorized, in order that all taxable
property in each county and Baltimore City might be
periodically reassessed. 27 It is difficult to believe that
Chapter 73 represents a further step forward. If an owner
of real property believes that his assessment is too high,
relative to other owners, the -burden of showing this undoubtedly rests on him. Where real estate has been generally underassessed, proof of discrimination may be difficult to obtain under any circumstances.2 8 In view of the enactment of Chapter 73 and of the present decision, it is apparent that such an aggrieved owner of real property will
be forced to contend with a mysterious variable of inflation which seems to be for the first time, firmly established
in Maryland law. However, some question arises as to
whether the inflation factor attacked by National in the
present case on the ground iof vagueness would be sustained
if attacked by an owner of real property.
JAMES

P. LEWIS

Insurance - Right Of Insurer To Subrogate
To Collateral Contract Rights
Of The Insured
In The Matter Of Future Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc.1
Future Manufacturing purchased certain refrigeration
equipment from the Scatena York Company under a conditional sales contract which among other things provided
that the vendee was to have the equipment insured against
fire for the benefit of the vendor and that the vendee would
remain liable for the purchase price should the property
be destroyed before such price was fully paid. Future
failed to have the equipment insured, but Scatena York,
on its own initiative, procured the desired coverage. Subsequently the equipment was destroyed by fire while
$17,654.88 of the purchase price remained unpaid. Scatena
2 Rogan v. Commrs. of Calvert County, 194 Md. 299, 71 A. 2d, 47 (1950),
discusses these efforts. See also Lewis, THE TAx ARTICLES OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 13 Md. L. Rev. 83 (1953).
2" When general undervaluation exists, the taxpayer may have to prove
not only the proper tax value of his realty but also, through an independent
appraisal of similar property, that his realty is assessed above the
general level." Tax Assessments of Real Property: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 Yale L. J., 335, 348 (1958). Tax Comm. v. -Brandt Cabinet
Works, 202 Md. 533, 97 A. 2d 290 (1953), is illustrative of the difficulty
of challenging an assessment where the inflation factor has been employed.

1165 F. 'Supp. 111 (D.C. N.D. Cal. S.D. 1958).
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recovered $13,244.20 from the insurer and, in addition,
realized $810.00 in salvage from the sale of the damaged
equipment. Shortly thereafter, Future was adjudged bankrupt, and Scatena asserted a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings for $16,844.88, representing the unpaid portion of
the purchase price less the salvage recovery. The referee
allowed Scatena's claim to the extent of $3,600.88 (the
value of the unpaid purchase price less the recovery under
the insurance policy and the recovery by way of salvage).
An additional amount equal to the value of the premiums
paid for the insurance was also allowed Scatena. The
referee found that the insurer could not assert a claim
against the bankrupt by way 'of subrogation to the vendor's

rights under the conditional sales contract, despite the
fact that the insurance policy expressly granted the insurer the right to subrogate to any claims the vendor had

against the vendee under the sales contract.2 The District
Court affirmed, giving the vendee the benefit of the vendor's
insurance.
In discussing the possible remedies which could be
afforded under the circumstances of the instant case, the
court suggested three ways in which the rights of the
interested parties might be resolved: (1) to allow the
vendor to recover the full contract price and the insurance
(which in effect would allow a double recovery); (2) to
allow the insurance proceeds to affect the unpaid portion
of the purchase price to the extent of such proceeds, thereby
giving the vendee the benefit of the vendor's insurance; or
(3) to allow the insurer to subrogate to the vendor's contract rights for the unpaid purchase price.3
The Court was of the opinion that the first approach
would contravene public policy, by increasing the moral
hazard of the insurer -bymaking the property more valuable
after its destruction than before, and in actually allowing a
double recovery by the insured vendor. Courts, in general,
are in accord with this view.' The Court of Appeals of
The policy provision as to subrogation read:
"In the event of any payment under the policy the Company shall
be subrogated to all the assured's rights of recovery therefor against
any person or organizatiton and the assured shall execute and deliver
instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights." Ibid., 112.
3 Ibid., 113.

' Deming v. Merchants Cotton Press & Storage Co., 90 Tenn. 306, 17
S.W. 89 (1891) ; Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 315 Mich.
393, 24 N.W. 2d 104 (1946) ; Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Chicago Tunnel
Terminal Co., 12 Ill. 2d 539, 139 N.E. 2d 770 (1956) ; Washington Fire
Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421, 442 (1870). For a general discussion of
this problem see: 2 RIOHARDS, INSURANCE (5th ed. 1952), 662.
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Maryland, in Washington Fire Insurance Co. v. Kelly,' rejected the suggestion of a possible double recovery under
similar circumstances, saying:
".... the contract of insurance is strictly a contract of
indemnity, and the mortgagee is not entitled to recover from the insurer the value of the property lost,
and his whole debt besides, from the mortgagor."'
Since the courts are almost uniformly opposed to allowing a double recovery by the insured vendor, the basic
problem in the instant case becomes one of determining
whether to allow the vendee to benefit from the vendor's
insurance, although he failed to fulfill his obligation under
the contract of sale by not obtaining the insurance 'himself,
or to allow the insurer to minimize his loss by subrogating
him to the contract rights of the vendor. Before dealing
directly with this problem, it is desirable to briefly inquire
into the nature of the doctrine of subrogation and determine if and when it is applicable to collateral contract
rights.
Generally it is recognized that subrogation is an equitable right taken from the civil law,7 and is considered to
be legal when it arises by operation of law,' as in most
cases, or conventional when it arises by express provisions
in a contract.9 The basis of the doctrine seems to be analogous to the theory of suretyship. Thus, a tortfeasor is
considered to be the party primarily liable, and the insurer
secondly liable, producing the result that the insurer is
entitled to proceed against the party primarily liable
when he is caused to idemnify the insured. 10 Likewise, in
the vendor-vendee situation, such as is present in the
instant case, the debtor vendee is considered to be primarily liable while the insurer is only secondarily liable,
since in effect he is merely insuring the vendor's security
'32 Md. 421 (1870).
'Ibid., 442. It is noted that the Washington case Involved a mortgage
situation rather than a conditional sale.
729 Am. Jur. 1000, Insurance, § 1335; Comment, Subrogation of the
Insurer to Collateral Rights of the Insured, 28 Col. L. Rev. 202 (1958) ;
King, Subrogation under Contract8 In8uring Property, 30 Texas L. Rev.
62, 71-85 (1951).
'The word "legal" is not used in contradistinction to "equitable".
'Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 Md. L. Rev. 201
(1939). In addition it is noted that in Maryland 8 MD. CODE (1957),
Art. 101, § 58, grants an employer the right of subrogation where the
employee recovers from him for an injury sustained because of the acts
of a third person, and by 1 Mo. CoDE (1957) Art. 8, § 3, the right of subrogation is given to a surety in a bond or other obligation.
10Supra, n. 7; VANCE, INSURANCE (3rd ed. 1951), 787-8, § 134; Leavitt
v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 90 Me. 153, 160; 37 A. 886 (1897).
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for the debt." Essentially subrogation is an equitable
right which places the 'burden of loss upon the person
primarily responsible for it and the insurer's right of
subrogation arises out 12of the nature of the contract - as a
contract of indemnity.
In mortgage cases, where the mortgagee obtains insurance for his own benefit, the insurer has been allowed to
subrogate to the mortgagee's right to recover payment of
the debt from the mortgagor." The reasoning behind the
rule seems to be that the mortgagor takes the risk of loss,
and consequently, the insurer is actually insuring the
property which represents the security for the debt. In
such cases the theory of suretyship applies. Conversely,
where the mortgagee and the mortgagor are both insured
under the same policy, there can be no right of subrogation,4
unless the policy is somehow voided as to the mortgagor.
Similarly, where a shipper procures insurance on his
goods which are then entrusted to a common carrier, the
shipper's insurer is allowed to subrogate to the shipper's
rights on the coverage contract. 5 The reasoning in such
cases appears to be based on the fact that almost absolute
liability is imposed upon the carrier by law. Since the
carrier is legally responsible for the goods, and can escape
liability only by proving an act of God or similar occur"Interstate Ice & Power Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y.
95, 152 N.E. 476 (1926) ; McCoy v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 261, 40
N.W. 2d 146 (1949).
Nat. Garment Co. v. N.Y.C. & St. L. R. Co., 173 F. 2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949).
'First National Bank of Elk City v. 'Springfield Fire and Marine Inance Co., 104 Kan. 278, 178 P. 413 (1919); Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto
Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So. 807 (1930) ; Union Assurance Society
v. Equitable Trust Co., 127 Tex. 618, 84 -S.W. 2d 1151 (1936); Combs v.
American Insurance Co., 286 Ky. 535, 177 S.W. 2d 881 (1944); Pacific
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 266 Ala. 606, 97 So. 2d 797 (1957); Leyden
v. Lawrence, 79 N.J. Eq. 113, 81 A. 121 (1911); Milwaukee Mechanics
Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 76 Or. 570, 149 P. 542 (1915). The only jurisdiction
consistently in disagreement with the rule is Massachusetts, e.g. International Trust Co. v. Boardmon, 149 Mass. 158, 21 N.E. 239 (1881) which
reasons that the mortgage contract Is wholly collateral to the insurance
and therefore not available to the insurer. In Maryland see Washington
Fire Insurance Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421 (1870); Grangers Mutual Fire
Ins. Co. v. Farmers National Bank, 164 Md. 441, 165 A. 479 (1933);
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dilworth, 167 Md. 232, 173 A. 22 (1934)
and Frontier Mortgage Corp. v. Heft, 146 Md. 1, 13, 125 A. 809 (1924)
where the court remarked:
"The mortgagor derives no benefit from a policy covering the
interest of the mortgagee alone, but is bound to pay the mortgage
debt to the insurers when they become his substituted creditors."
"Savings Bank of Ansonia v. Schancupp, 108 Conn. 588, 144 A. 36
(1928); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 98 Neb.
446, 153 N.W. 553 (1915).
1Wager v. Providence Ins. Co., 150 U. S. 99 (1893) ; National Garment
Co. v. New York, C. & ,St. L. R. Co., 173 F. 2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Adams
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 1027, 188 N.W. 823, 24 A.L.R. 189
(1922).
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rence, he is, in effect, an insurer of the goods and is the
primary obligor, and again the theory of suretyship will
apply. It is general practice today for carriers to provide
in their bills of lading that any insurance on the goods will
inure to their 'benefit. Such a provision has been held to
vitiate the right of the insurer to subrogate to the insured
shipper's right against the carrier.16 On the other hand,
the insurance companies have adopted a policy provision
which acts to avoid the contract insurance where the insured agrees that the benefits received through the insurance are to inure to the carrier's benefit. This type of policy
provision has also been sustained by the courts, on the
theory that the parties are free to contract as they desire.'
The greatest divergence of opinion is found in the cases
involving contracts for the sale of realty or personalty, such
as the one currently under discussion. Some jurisdictions
have maintained that the situation is closely analogous to
the mortgage situation mentioned above, and have applied
the same rules. 18 In Home Insurance Co. v. Bishop, 9 the
Maine court found that an insurer is entitled to subrogate
the rights of a conditional vendor against the vendee for
the balance due on the purchase price, where the vendee
intentionally destroyed the goods. Likewise, where the
insurance originally covering both vendor and vendee is
cancelled as to the vendee for failure to pay premiums or
for similar reasons, the insurer is subrogated;2 0 however,
this rule only applies where the policy contains a losspayable clause,2 thereby making the right of subrogation
contractual or conventional and not a legal application of
the equitable doctrine.
The general view in cases of this nature seems to be
that expressed in Leavitt v. CanadianPac. Ry. Co.,2 2 where
the court said:

1e Jackson Co. v. Boylslon Mutual Ins. Co., 139 Mass. 508, 2 N.E. 103
(1885): Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N.W. 4,
39 A.L.R. 1116 (1925) ; Carsairs v. Mechanics Ins. Co., 18 F. 473 (D.C.
Md. 1883).
11Insurance Co. of N.A. v. Easton, 73 Tex. 167, 11 S.W. 180 (1889):
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N.W. 4, 39 A.L.R. 116
(1925).
"Home Insurance Co. v. Bishop, 140 Me. 72, 34 A. 2d 22 (1943);
Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95,
152 N.E. 476 (1926); Leavitt v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 90 Me. 153, 37
A. 886 (1897).
"Ibid.

Oadillac Auto Co. v. Fisher, 54 R.I. 264, 172 A. 393 (1934).
"Fields v. Western Millers, 290 N.Y. 209, 48 N.E. 2d 489 (1943). The
court pointed out that the insurer collected the premiums for a risk and
could not in good conscience keep its premiums and be made whole too.
22Supra, n. 18.
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"...
an insurer who has paid a loss for which
another is responsible, either by statute or at common
law, is subrogated to any claim that the insured had
against the person whose tortious act caused the injury;
or who, for
any other reason, is liable to the owner
23
therefor."
In each of the above cases the conclusions seem to be
justified that the vendee, by his acts (while either amounted
to malfeasance or non-malfeasance), should not be entitled
to any equitable relief and what equities are present favor
the insurer.
However, this doctrine has been applied in less compelling circumstances. In Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co.,24 the Court of Appeals of New
York held that the insurer was entitled to subrogate to
the insured vendor's rights where the goods were destroyed
during a period of negotiation between vendor and vendee
- after the latter had been in default and the former had
caused the goods to be attached and seized by the sheriff.
Likewise, in McCoy v. Continental Ins. Co.,25 the Michigan
Court allowed the insurer to subrogate to the insured
vendor's rights where the insurer was caused to indemnify
the vendor for loss by fire, but in this instance the policy
contained a subrogation clause and in addition had been
procured by the vendor on his own initiative.
The Court in the instant case, recognizing the holdings
of the above cases, said:
"... an insurer upon indemnifying an insured mortgagee for the loss of his interest in destroyed mortgaged property is entitled to be subrogated to the
mortgagee's right
to enforce payment of the mort'28
gagor's debt.
However, the Court refused to apply this principle 'of the
mortgage cases as it did not feel the analogy compelling,
but rather gave the benefit of the vendor's insurance to the
vendee. In so doing, the Court, after voicing its opinion
that authority in support of either view was almost equal,
said:
"But when an insured vendor has been indemnified
by his insurer for the loss of property subject to a
"Ibid., 888.

Supra, n. 18.
"326 Mich. 261, 40 N.W. 2d 146 (1949).
"In re Future Manufacturing Cooperative, 165 F. Supp. 111, 113 (D.C.
N.D. Cal. S.D. 1958).
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sales contract, the tendency has been to give the vendee
the benefit of the vendor's insurance rather than to
subrogate the insurer to the vendor's' 2' right
to recover
7
the purchase price from the vendee.
This theory, which has been accepted by a number of
jurisdictions is based upon the idea that the vendee is the
equitable owner of the property he buys from the time
the contract of sale is made and, as a result, is entitled to
any benefit that may inure to the estate in the interim,2 8
and that the vendor retains an insurable interest in the
property in the form of a lien upon the property29 until
he is fully paid. Thus, if the property is destroyed between
the time of the contract and the payment of the purchase
price, the vendee is considered to be entitled to the benefit
from the vendor's insurance which itself is looked upon as
a benefit accruing to the insured property.
In Gilbert & Ives v. Port,0 the court said:
"The vendee, because he is the equitable owner,
and, as such, is compelled to sustain the loss, occurring
after the sale and before the conveyance, is entitled
to any benefit that may accrue to the estate."'"
Following this theory, the courts have given the vendee the
benefit of the vendor's insurance; where the vendor, before
being paid by the vendee, reconveyed the property to
another, and the other in turn conveyed the property to
a fourth person who had it insured;8 2 where the vendee
actually contracted to bear the loss 'of damage due to fire
and to purchase insurance on the property, but failed to
do so;"3 where the vendor had purchased insurance on his
own and in his own name; 4 where the insurer required
the vendor to assign to it the vendor's rights to the purchase price; 5 and where the sales contract actually con- Ibid., 114.
2Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 P. 586 (1911) ; Gilbert
and Ives v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876) ; Skinner & Sons' Co. v. Houghton,
92 Md.68, 85, 48 A. 85 (1900).
"White v. Gilman et al, 138 Cal. 375, 71 P. 436 (1903); Skinner &
Sons' Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 85, 48 A. 85 (1900) ; McRae v. McRae,
78 Md. 70, 27 A. 1038 (1893).
soSupra, n. 28.
81Ibid., 293.
"White v. Gilman et al, 138 Cal. 375, 71 P. 436 (1903).
aAutomatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robinson-Slagle L. Co., 147 So. 542
(La. 1933).
8Brakhage v. Tracey, 13 S.D. 343, 83 N.W. 363 (1900); Marion v.
Walcott, 68 N.J. Eq. 20, 50 A. 242 (1904) ; In the Matter of Future Mfg.
Coop., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 111 (1958).
"Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S.W. 1094 (1926)
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tained a subrogation clause. 36 The doctrine has been applied where the vendor was required to obtain the insurance, but failed to do so."
The fact that the vendee in the instant case failed to
obtain insurance on the property, as he was contractually
bound to do, made little difference, since it is well established that where the vendor obtains insurance, despite
the vendee's contractual duty, it is unnecessary for the
latter to perform his 8 obligation, and he is, nonetheless,
entitled to the benefit.
This view clearly prevails in Maryland. 9 In Skinner
& Sons" Co. v. Houghton,40 the Court of Appeals held that
the assignee of the vendee was entitled to the benefit of the
insurance despite the fact that the vendors had obtained
it prior to the contract of sale and had not surrendered
title or possession at the time the property was destroyed
by fire. In reaching its decision the Court said:
"It is true that she [the vendor] had an insurable
interest in the property until the purchase money
was paid.... Under a contract of this kind, in equity,
the vendee is in fact considered as the owner of the
land, and although the vendor may still retain the title,
he holds it as a trustee for the vendee, to whom all the
beneficial interest 'has passed, with a lien on the estate
[or property] as security for any unpaid portion of the
purchase money .... Thus, if property is destroyed
between the time of effecting the contract for the sale
and delivery of the deed, the proceeds of an insurance
policy upon such property belongs to the vendor between him and the (insurer), but the former is held
to act as trustee for the vendee and must therefore
account to his cestui trust in equity.""1

"'Inthe Matter of Future Mfg. Coop., Inc., 165 F. 'Supp. 111 (D.C. N.D.
Cal., S.D. 1958).
-Sommers v. Dukes, 214 Md. 351, 135 A. 2d 419 (1957). This case
seems to be more justifiable than some of the others as the seller was
required to obtain the insurance for the buyer's protection.
18Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robtilon-Slagle L. Co., 147 So. 542, (IA.
1933) ; Marion v. Walcott, 68 NJ. Eq. 20, 59 A. 242, 37 A.L.R. 1324 (1904);
Russell v. Elliott, 45 S.D. 184, 186 N.W. 824, 22 A.L.R. 556 (1922);
McGinley v. Forest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74, 22, A.L.R. 567 (1921).
8'Skinner & Sons' Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 A. 85 (1900) ; McRae
v. McRae, 78 Md. 70, 27 A. 1038 (1893); Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md.
530 (1884); Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md. 301 (1869); ,Sommers v. Dukes,
214 Md. 351, 135 A. 2d 419 (1957); Royal Insur. Co. v. Drury, 150 Md.
211, 221, 132 A. 635 (1926).
0

' Ibid.
11Ibid., 85-86, 88.
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In making a thorough examination of the problem, the
court in the Skinner case adopted the view of Hall v. Jones42
that, where the sale concerns real property, after a contract
of sale is made the vendor's interest is not real estate but
personal property, 4 the interest being in the security for
the debt. The court further recognized the view of Heller
v. Marine Bank44 that an insurance policy is only a contract
for personal indemnity, but that indemnity is against a
possible loss on account of the interest of the insured
in the thing mentioned in the policy and when the vendee
fully pays the vendor that interest is at an end and likewise
the indemnity no longer exists.
It would appear that the decisions which adopt this
view, giving the vendee the benefit of the vendor's insurance, violate the concept of an insurance policy being a
personal contract, but this violation is excusable on the
theory that the vendee could have taken an assignment
of the policy if he had so desired. Nonetheless, it is clear
that where the risk of loss remains on the vendor under
the contract of sale, the vendee obtains no benefit from
the insurance because he can suffer no loss in the event
of damage to or destruction of the property.45 Thus the
doctrine is limited to those situations where the risk of
loss is upon the vendee. Furthermore, at least in Maryland,
the doctrine will only apply where the vendor-vendee relationship exists and not in the analogous situation between mortgagor and mortgagee. 6
In conclusion, it appears that the court in the instant
case, in denying the insurer the right of subrogation and
instead granting the vendee the benefit of the vendor's insurance, adopted the more equitable approach since the
insurer did contract to indemnify the vendor and did, in
fact, accept the risk of loss. Furthermore, the equities
clearly favor the vendee as he was not responsible for the
loss, and should not be called upon to suffer such loss when
another actually obligated itself to take the risk of loss.
DONALD

ROBERT

C. AL.L
E. PowEIL

21 Md. 439 (1863).
"Ibid., 447, citing Smith & Gage, 41 Barbour 60 N.Y.S. Ct. (1863).

"89 Md. 602, 43 A. 800 (1899).
41It follows as a natural result of the principle laid down in the cited
cases that if the vendee We to gain the benefit of the vendor's insurance
where the risk of loss is upon him, he should not be entitled to so benefit
if the risk of loss remains on the vendor, as the vendee cannot be held to
be the equitable owner.
," Mullan v. Beldin, 130 Md. 313. 322, 100 A. 384 (1917).

